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ISSUES 
POINT I 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SEARCH WARRANT IT SUPPORTS 
FAIL TO MEET STATUTORY AND CASE LAW REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S / APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE SEARCH 
WARRANT AND SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE. 
In applying the totality of the circumstances analysis, one, of necessity, 
first looks at the individual parts (of the Affidavit [R. 68-71]) to determine the 
totality. Consequently, if one adds up a column of zeros, the total is zero. 
In the case of the aforementioned Affidavit, when one looks for probable 
causes to believe that methamphetamine, or any of the other items listed, would 
be found at 462 South 100 West in St. George, the totality of the information 
provided in the Affidavit is completely lacking. And that, in larger part, is 
because the information provided to the officers, by Confidential Source #1, was 
obtained by Confidential Source #1 from Confidential Source #I's own 
unnamed sources [R. 68-71]. The same is probably true of the information in 
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the Affidavit from Confidential Source #2; however, the syntax is so poor that 
the reader cannot be certain. 
Even though the author of said Affidavit made some effort to establish the 
reliability of Confidential Source #1 and Confidential Source #2 [R.71], no 
effort was made to establish the reliability of the [unnamed] sources of 
Confidential Source #1, or the reliability of their information. None of the 
information provided by Confidential Source #1 was observed by Confidential 
Source #1, but allegedly was relayed to Confidential Source #1 by persons not 
named, described, or identified, in any respect, in the Affidavit. 
Could an officer round up "the usual suspects", ask them what they had 
seen, or heard, about activities at a certain location, and then use the information 
so collected [and without further substantiation] to obtain a search warrant to 
search that location, without presenting anything to the magistrate to support the 
reliability of "the usual suspects", or their information? 
What you have in said Affidavit is that "so and so" told "such and such" 
to the confidential sources; thus, leaving the issuing magistrate with no way 
[method of divining] of knowing anything whatsoever, about the sources ("so 
and sos") of the confidential source. 
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In the instant Affidavit, nothing is added by the fact that Confidential 
Source #1 is claimed to be reliable. There is no basis in Utah, or Federal, law 
that allows police confidential informants to have confidential informants. Can 
a confidential source verify the reliability of his confidential source, or the 
reliability of the information relayed to him by his confidential source? No! 
* * * 
An informant's basis of knowledge and veracity 
are inherent in a controlled drug buy. The affiant 
orchestrated the drug purchases and therefore, was 
able to attest to the results of the purchases from first 
hand observation. Although the names of the C.I.s 
were never revealed at the suppression hearing, the 
officer's personal knowledge of the events created 
sufficient informant reliability for a probable cause 
determination. State v Rosenbaum, 845 P.2d 962,204 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (Ct. App. 1993) 
The State argues that Appellant has not cited any case law to support his 
argument that confidential sources are not allowed to rely on their own 
confidential sources. That is because the use of confidential sources' 
information, m affidavits for search warrants, is an exception to the hearsay 
prohibition, and that exception has long had the approval of the courts. Jencks 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) 
Therefore, since the courts have not created a further exception to allow 
confidential sources to rely on hearsay, we will not find case law precedent. 
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In addition, no attempt was made in the Affidavit to establish the 
reliability of the persons (or the information provided thereby) who allegedly 
relayed the information to the confidential sources in this case. 
If such unsupported information is, in this case and in the future, to be 
found sufficient to justify the issuance of search warrants, then we are back to 
"general warrants", also known as "bills of attainder/' 
Under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, the issuing magistrate 
should disregard all information in the Affidavit that is not found to be from a 
reliable source and is itself, reliable. Quoting from Rosenbaum, Id., 
Factors to be considered [in the Gates test! include, 
among others, the veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge of confidential informants." Id. (citing 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987)). "The 
weight accorded these factors may vary according to 
the circumstances." Id. at 1109-10. The magistrate's 
task is to consider whether under the circumstances 
described in the affidavit, '"there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be founcl in 
a particular place."' State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah App. 1992) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 
S. Ct. at 2332). 
In the Affidavit of the instant case, when those deletions are made, onlv 
the following facts remain in the Affidavit that should be looked at as possible 
support for the issuance of the search warrant: 
1. That Confidential Source #2 told Detective Randall that 
Delanie and Kenyon had a methamphetamine lab in the trunk 
Scarth, Dent & Whitel«»*r pr> 
of a car they were driving and Confidential Source #2 
specifically described the laboratory equipment, and supplies 
therein, together with a piece of clothing with a strong urine 
odor, 
2. that Detectives Randall and Trani talked with the owner of 
that car, who said he saw some of those lab items in the trunk 
and discarded them in the trash, 
3. that the detectives searched the trunk of the car, found 
nothing, but one did detect an odor that she associated with a 
methamphetamine lab, 
4. that Confidential Source #2 told Detective Randall that 
Delanie frequents the Bangerter residence, 
5. that Delanie hangs around Kyle Corawell, who is at the 
Bangerter residence a lot, 
6. that Corn well drives a yellow bullet bike motorcycle, 
7. that the Officers located, at the Bangerter residence, the 
vehicle that Delanie and Kenyon were driving, 
a. that it was observed, by the officers, at 11:30 P.M., 
and left after 2:00 A.M., 
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b. that the officers also saw a vehicle stop at the 
Bangerter residence while the residence was under 
surveillance. The vehicle was stopped on a traffic 
violation. The front seat passenger was Eric 
Fjermestad. who is known by us to be involved in the 
local drug culture. 
8. Mr. Cornwell has been the subject to more that one 
investigation where he was known to be manufacturing methamphetamine in 
both Utah, and Las Vegas, NV., and Mr. Cornwell is a (sic) well known in the 
local drug culture as a methamphetamine cook. 
9. Mr. Kenyon Staheli was also on the periphery of an 
investigation the Task Force was conducting where the police suspected a 
methamphetamine manufacture operation was taking place. 
10. Johnny and Grant Bangerter have been investigated for, or 
suspected to be involved in, the manufacture of methamphetamine in the past. 
11. On November 29, 1999, members of the Task Force stopped 
a subject by the name of Shirl Shane Johnson leaving Mr. Bangerter's residence; 
Mr. Bangerter was with him when he was stopped. 
12. The Task Force had previously been investigating Mr. 
Johnson for suspected drug activity in the LaVerkin area. 
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13. When Mr. Johnson was stopped, he had several cases of 
book batches in the bed of his truck. 
a. When Officer Tram, and other members of the task 
force, asked what he was doing with the matches, he replied "They are not for 
what you think." 
b. When Officer Trani asked him what he thought we 
would think about them, he stammered and replied, "They are not stolen 
property."" 
14. Officer Trani called the motel in Hurricane where the 
matches were from. The owner told the officer that they were old matches. 
15. Officer Trani also explained to the owner that the match 
books could be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
16. The owner (of the motel) told Officer Trani they (sic) 
suspected Ms. Gubler (who provided Johnson with the matches) was involved in 
drugs. [R. 5-10] 
Items 1, 2, and 3 above, support probable cause to seek a warrant to 
search the City landfill; not to search the residence at 462 South 100 West. Item 
4 establishes some connection between Delanie and the Bangerter residence, 
which doesn't appear to be that sinister, and given its broadest meaning, would 
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only indicate that a person (Delanie), with some nexus to clandestine laboratory 
equipment and supplies, frequents the Bangerter residence. 
Item 5 only shows that Delanie and Cornwell are associates and that 
Cornwell is often at the Bangerter residence. 
Item 6 adds nothing to probable cause. 
Item 7 indicates that Delanie and Kenyon were seen in a vehicle that had 
formerly had a drug lab in it, and that the vehicle was seen at the Bangerter 
residence, and that Eric Fjermestad, who was known by the police to be 
involved in the local drug trade, was in that vehicle when the police stopped it. 
Item 8 states that Mr. Cornwell was known to be manufacturing 
methamphetamine in Utah and Las Vegas. Also, when Item 8 is considered 
with Item 5, they show that a known methamphetamine manufacturer was at the 
Banserter residence a lot. 
Regarding Item 9, there is a lack of nexus (stated in the Affidavit) 
between Kenyon Staheli and the Bangerters, or the Bangerter residence. 
Item 10 speaks for itself. 
Item 11 through item 16 establish that Shirl Shane Johnson was stopped 
while leaving the Bangerter residence, had several cases of book matches m his 
truck, that Mr. Johnson's story was questionable, and that the matches could be 
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
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Therefore, it is submitted that the only items that could be considered for 
probable cause purposes, in the Affidavit, by the issuing magistrate, would only 
establish that a methamphetamine cook was at the Bangerter residence a lot; that 
a few people known to the police, as being involved m the drug culture, were 
either at, or were seen leaving, the Bangerter residence; that two of their 
vehicles were seen at the Bangerter residence, and that one of them was seen in 
a vehicle with a Mr. Bangerter; that police stopped Mr. Johnson when he was 
leaving the Bangerter residence, and that he had several cases of book matches, 
which could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. None of the above 
would cause any reasonable person to reasonably believe that the items sought 
would be found m the residence at 462 South 100 West, in St. George, Utah. 
Thus, when one reads the Affidavit, in its totality, and with careful 
scrutiny, it is clear that the Affidavit contains insufficient probable cause that 
any of the items sought would be found at the premises described in the search 
warrant. 
The State argues that the police independently corroborated the 
information supplied to them by their confidential sources. That is not correct! 
Independent mvestigation by police did not corroborate the information 
from Confidential Sources, except from Delanie's father, regarding the goods in 
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the trunk. These items were only discovered in the Delanie vehicle after the 
police had released it to Delanie. after stopping the vehicle and arresting Kenyon 
Staheli; plus, they were thrown away and could not have been in the Bangerter 
residence. 
... An informant's credibility is determined based upon the 
totality of the circumstances, including the traditional review of the 
basis of his knowledge and reliabilitv. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 
213. 238. 103 S.Ct. 2317. 2332. 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): Carrazana, 
921 F.2d at 1564. The Gates standard only requires that "major 
portions" of the informant's statements be verified. 462 U.S. at 246. 
103 S.Ct. at 2336. 
POINT 2 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT FAILS TO LINK 
APPELLANT, OR GRANT JUSTIN BANGERTER, TO THE 
RESIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE SEARCHED, AND THUS, SOME OF 
THE INFORMATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
SEARCH WARRANT DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THE SEARCH OF THE RESIDENCE AT 462 SOUTH 100 WEST. 
If one refers to the section in the affidavit entitled, "LOCATION OF 
SEARCH", the reader will discover that the affidavit does not state the names of 
any persons who resided at 462 South 100 West. St. George, Utah. 
The affidavit contains nothing to indicate that the officer did anything to 
determine who lived at said address, or to verify who occupied the premises 
located thereon. 
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In ATTACHMENT "C-2'" [R. 10], attached to the Search Warrant (and 
n rred to in the affidavit), there is a paragraph that, in fact, gives evidence that 
the police did not know who leased, rented, resided at, or occupied the premises 
at said address, before, or at the time, they obtamed the Search Warrant. 
That language is as follows: 
"ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT / AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
* * * 
4. Residency papers; to include utility receipts and or bills, rental agreements / 
lease, articles showing occupancy of the premises ... 
* * * " 
This has significant impact on the quality, and quantity, of supposed 
probable cause information in the affidavit. If the police did not know that 
Johnny Winston Bangerter, or Grant Justin Bangerter, occupied, or resided at, 
462 South 100 West in St. George, Utah, then the information about them, 
contained in the Affidavit, does not constitute probable cause for the police, let 
alone the magistrate, to have a reasonable belief that drug activity was occurring 
in the residence, at said address, and the issuing magistrate should have mentally 
excised all references to "Mr. Bangerter," "Johnny Bangerter," "Grant 
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Bangerler," "Johnny Winston Bangerter," "Grant Justin Bangerterr and the 
"Bangerter residence", from the affidavit when he read it. 
What if they didn't live there? Quoting the Independence Institute. 
http://i2i.ors: Drug War Casualties, author Mike Krause, Nov. 15, 2000 
... Ismael Mena was killed last year (September 1999) 
by a paramilitary police unit serving a drug warrant on 
trie wrong house Here in Denver, it was more than a 
tragedy; his death was part of a national pattern. Since 
Mr. M'ena's death the body count has increased. 
Less than a month Before Mr. Mena was killed, 
an unarmed 64 year old grandfather of 14 , Mario Paz, 
was shot dead in his own home after a Compton, 
California, SWAT team blew the locks off his door in 
a late night drug raid where no drugs were found. 
In September of this year, eleven year old 
Alberto Sepulveda was killed by a blast "from a SWAT 
shotgun while spread-eagle on the floor of his parent's 
Modesto, California, home during a drug raid where 
no drugs were found. 
in October, 64 year old John Adams died at the 
hands of police while presumably defending his home 
from invaders when Lebanon, Tennessee, police 
kicked in his door at night to serve a drug warrant, the 
wrong door on the wrong house. 
Probable Cause to search a home is not based on inference, but 
requires a direct link to the home. 
Not all courts are receptive to inferential probable cause. Some courts do 
not accept inferences drawn from training, and experience, as being sufficient to 
establish probable cause, despite the fact that an officer, through such an 
inference, establishes a seemingly clear link between the evidence of the crime 
and the home. 
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In the decision in Yancey v. Arkansas, 345 Ark. 103, 44 S.W.3d 315 (Ark. 
05/24/2001), the Arkansas Supreme Court disapproved of the search of the 
defendant's home based solely upon his involvement in criminal activity. In 
Yancey, an Arkansas game and fish officer observed a vehicle being driven 
down a road in a remote wooden area. Using night-vision equipment, the officer 
observed the occupants of the vehicle remove containers of water from their 
vehicle and water plants growing in the area, activity that was later determined 
to be the growing of marijuana. 
He followed the vehicle, for approximately 5 miles, until it arrived at Lee 
Roy Cloud's residence. Upon his arrival at the residence, the officer asked the 
passengers, Lee Roy Cloud, and Curtis Yancey, what they were doing down the 
road. They told the officer that they were "frogging". The officer knew that 
there were no frogs in the area in which he had seen them, and he did not see 
any frogging equipment in the vehicle. 
The officer determined that Cloud previously had been convicted several 
times for possession of controlled substances, and police intelligence indicated 
that Cloud and Yancey were involved in marijuana trafficking. Approximately 
5 days later, the officer obtained search warrants to search Cloud's and Yancey's 
residences, and marijuana was found in each of the defendant's homes. The 
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defendants were convicted for possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to deliver. 
The defendants appealed their convictions, alleging that the District Court 
should have suppressed the evidence obtained, at their homes, pursuant to the 
search warrants. The defendants alleged that there was not a sufficient 
connection, between their illegal marijuana growing and their homes, to 
establish probable cause that evidence of criminal activity would be found inside 
their homes. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and ruled 
that there were insufficient facts, provided in the affidavit, from which to infer 
that there would be any evidence in the homes searched. The Court stated that, 
standing alone, circumstantial evidence that the suspects may be drug dealers, is 
not circumstantial evidence that evidence of drug dealing will be found in their 
homes. 
Other courts have previously arrived at the same conclusion and some 
examples are: 
In State v. Them. 138 Wash. 2d 133, 977 P.2d 582 (Wash. 06/10/1999) 
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington decided that an officer's belief, 
based upon his training and experience, that persons who cultivate marijuana 
often keep records and material related to the cultivation in their homes, was not 
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sufficient to establish probable cause to search a suspected drug cultivator's 
residence. 
In / mted States v. Freeman. 585 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982), the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "[TJhe fact that there is probable cause to 
believe that a person has committed a crime does not automatically give the 
police probable cause to search his house for evidence of that crime. 'If that were 
so. there would be no reason to distinguish search \\ arrants from arrest 
warrants.'" 
See. e.g., State v. Silvestn. 618 A.2d 821 (N.H. 1992). In Silvestri. the 
court rejected a link to the defendant's residence that was based on the affiants 
experience that it was common to find illegal drug contraband, and other 
evidence, in the homes of drug traffickers. The court determined that, "whiie the 
affidavit ma\ have established probable cause to arrest the defendant for selling 
marijuana, it did not establish probable cause to search his residence." Id. at 823. 
Despite the inference drawn b> the affiant from his experience, the court found 
that "[ijn the affidavit before us there was nothing to indicate that evidence of 
the crime was kept at. or picked up from, the defendant's residence other than 
the mere fact that the defendant was suspected of being a criminal." Id. at 824. 
The court further stated: "The State urges us to adopt a per se rule that if the 
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magistrate determines that a person is a drug dealer, then a finding of probable 
cause to search that person's residence automatical^ follows. "I he Mate 
contends that the issuing magistrate can find that the tact mat a person is an 
active drug dealer creates a tair probability that controlled drugs or other indicia 
of drug dealing could be found in the drug dealer's residence. We do not accept 
the States invitation and note that we have consistently required some nexus 
between the defendants residence and drug-dealing activities in order to 
establish probable cause to search the residence." Id. at 824. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court decided Silvestn exclusively on state constitutional 
grounds Id., at 822. 
See also United States v. Gomez, 652 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N. Y. 1987) 
(a court can consider an officer's expert opinion that drug traffickers often keep 
records in their residences, but that alone will not be enough to establish a nexus 
between the illegal trafficking and the residence to establish probable cause tor a 
search): United States v. Schultz. 14 F.3d 1093. 1097 (6th Cir. 1994) ("While 
officer 'training and experience1 may be considered in establishing probable 
causc.it cannot substitute for a lack of evidentiary nexus."), State v Them, 977 
F.2d 582 ("Wash. 1999) (en banc). 
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In Them. id., the police had information from two sources that the 
landlord, whose name was given as simply "Steve," was the supplier of 
marijuana to Laurence McKone. I he police had earlier seized over a one-half 
pound of marijuana from McKone's residence; they also seized, from the 
basement. 5 pounds of marijuana "shake." which is material pruned from 
cultivated marijuana plants. One informant indicated that the basement was 
exclusively controlled by Mekone's landlord, "Steve". The police were 
ultimately able to identify "Steve" as Stephen Thein. The police prepared an 
affidavit for a search warrant for Them's residence. The affidavit contained 
generalized statements of belief regarding the common habits of drug dealers. 
I he affidavit stated, m pertinent part, the following: "Based on my experience 
and training, as well as the corporate knowledge and experience of other law 
enforcement officers. I am aware that it is generally a common practice for drug 
traffickers to store at least a portion of the drug inventory and drug related 
paraphernalia in their common residences It is generally a common practice for 
drug traffickers to maintain in their residences records relating to drug 
trafficking activities including records maintained on personal computers." Id , 
977 P.2d at 584. The court ruled that probable cause only exists if the affidavit 
sets forth facts sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that the defendant is 
probably involved in criminal activity, and that the evidence of that criminal 
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activity can be found in his home. The court stated that probabie cause requires 
a nexus between the criminal activity and the items to be seized and. in addition, 
a nexus between the items to be seized and the place searched. The Ihein court 
ruled that an officer's belief, that persons who cultivate marijuana often keep 
drug records and material in their house, is not a sufficient basis for probable 
cause to search the home of the drug cultivator. The court stated that, for there 
to be an inference that the suspect is in possession of illegal drugs at his home, 
there must be specific facts that point to his possession, such as observations of 
activity at the house that are indicative of criminal conduct. The court felt that 
generalized statements, regarding the common habits of drug traffickers, are 
insufficient to establish a link between the drug activity and a drug trafficker's 
home. 
POINT HI 
THE "LEON EXCEPTION" DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
WARRANT 
United States v Leon, 468 U.S 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
The Supreme Court, in Leon, heid that evidence seized, pursuant to a 
subsequently invalidated warrant, is admissible in court where the officers 
conducting the search acted in good faith reliance on the warrant. Id. at 922. 104 
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S. Ct. 3420. However, the coun in Leon identified four circumstances in which 
good faith will not be found: 
(1) "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial roie," 
becoming m effect a member of the search party team; 
(2) where the warrant was so facially deficient, "failing to particularize 
the place to be searched or the things to be seized [,J that the executing officers 
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid;" 
(3) where the affidavit included deliberate material omissions or 
misrepresentations "that the affiant knewfwere] false or would have 
known[wereJ false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;" and 
(4) where the affidavit was k"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 
921-22. 104 S. Ct. at 3420-3421 (citations omitted): accord State v. Lee. 863 P. 
2d 49, 55 (Utah App. 1993). State v Horton. 848 P. 2d 708. 711 (Utah App.. cert 
denied. 857 P. 2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
"A trial court's finding that an officer relied on a defective search warrant 
in good faith is subject to a de novo review by this court/" State v. Rowe, 806 
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P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), reversed on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Kep. 
14 (Utah 1992). 
After eliminating the hearsay upon hearsay from the affidavit in this case, 
we are left with the "bare bones" affidavit referred to in Leon; one that is 
"devoid of facts." See Leon, 468 U.S at 926, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. This affidavit 
m fact, may be an example of one, as referred to in State v Horton, 848 P. 2d at 
711, quoting Gates, as "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable". 
It should be readily apparent to an experienced police officer that 
unverified hearsay upon hearsay is not acceptable as facts in support of probable 
cause and that the inclusion of same in the affidavit would mislead a trusting 
Magistrate in the process of a quick read. 
By the police officer's failure to point out that not all of the informants 
were known to the police officers, and that their information, or even their 
existence, was not, and could not be, verified by said officers, was omission, or 
misrepresentation, of the facts, on the part of the affiant. 
dearth, Dent tin Whiteiey PC 
POINT IV 
BY FAILING TO ADDRESS ARGUMENTS RAISED IN 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF, THE DEFENDANT / APPELLANT DOES NOT 
ABANDON THE OTHER ISSUES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY RAISED AND 
ARGUED AND SPECIFICALLY ADOPTS THE ARGUMENT HE MADE 
IN HIS INITIAL BRIEF ON FILE HEREIN. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah has an interest in interrupting, and stopping, the drug 
trade within the state, and an interest in upholding the lower courts, when they 
are on target, and an interest in supporting the law enforcement officers, who 
regularly put themselves at risk in pursuit of lawbreakers: there is one other 
interest that cannot be forgotten, every citizen s interest in the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution ot United Mates ot America. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effecK against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall n«>f be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by (Jam or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the police and other government 
officials, from searching people's homes, or offices, or seizing their property, 
without reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed. In most 
cases, police can conduct a search of a person's home or office only after they 
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get a written search warrant from a judge, detailing where they will search and 
what they expect to find. 
To conclude that this affidavit rises to the level of probable cause, or to 
the particularity in describing the place to be searched, or to the particularity in 
describing the persons, or things, to be seized, as anticipated by the framers of 
the Constitution, will create an opportunity for mischief on the part of 
unscrupulous investigating officers using phantom informants, or an opportunity 
for stalkers to create situations whereby they gain information anonymously. 
... An informant's credibility is determined based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, including the traditional review of the basis of his knowledge and 
reliability. Illinois v. Gates, supra. 
Therefore, Defendant / Appellant, John W. Bangerter, respectfully 
requests that this Court grant his request for suppression of the search warrant, 
and suppression of any admissions against interest in the above entitled matter 
and that his conviction for possession of a controlled substance be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 27"1 day of June, 2002. 
Jim K. Scafth 
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